

Soft power at home and abroad: Sport diplomacy, politics and peace-building

International Area Studies Review
16(3) 235–243
© The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2233865913502971
ias.sagepub.com


Håvard Mokleiv Nygård

University of Oslo, Norway,
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway

Scott Gates

Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway,
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway

Abstract

Soft power is the power to persuade whereby one actor in a non-coercive manner convinces another to want the same things he/she wants. Sport can be used as tool of soft power both internationally and domestically. Peace-building and nation-building can be achieved through four mechanisms of sport diplomacy and politics: image-building; building a platform for dialogue; trust-building; and reconciliation, integration and anti-racism. These mechanisms are not deterministically controllable and can have unintended consequences. On the one hand, sporting events can be used as a means of building trust between adversaries. On the other, the hostilities between peoples can be mirrored on playing fields. This article examines the intended and unintended consequences of each mechanism. It also examines the role of confounding economic factors. Each article comprising this Special Issue explores a different mechanism of sport politics and public diplomacy.

Keywords

Anti-racism, causal mechanisms, image-building, integration, peace-building, platform for dialogue, reconciliation, soft power, sport diplomacy, trust-building

One year after the fall of the apartheid regime, in 1995, South Africa hosted the rugby World Cup. Traditionally, rugby had been a predominately “white” sport in South Africa. The newly elected President Mandela used the event to champion South African unity, moving rugby away from being a “white” sport to being a national sport for all. Mandela succeeded beyond expectations—the South African team won the tournament, a victory for all of South Africa. The sporting event was a mechanism employed to move toward the reconciliation and integration of a divided nation.

Corresponding author:

Håvard Mokleiv Nygård PRIO, Hausmanns gate 7, Oslo, 0186, Norway.
Email: h.m.nygard@stv.uio.no

In 1971 the US table tennis team formally requested to be invited to China. Later that year, they were invited and played a set of friendly matches. This sporting event paved the way for Nixon's visit to China and the eventual normalization of relations between the USA and China. Sport diplomacy in this case served as a means of peace-building between superpowers. Another example would be the Goodwill Games, which served to re-open sports relations between the USA and USSR after the 1980 US boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, and the 1984 USSR boycott of the Los Angeles Games.

Sport can be used as a policy instrument for either domestic or foreign policy. It need not be exclusively a tool of foreign policy (such as "Ping-Pong diplomacy"), but as the South African case shows, it may address domestic conflict as well. Great and middle powers engage in sport diplomacy in a variety of ways. This may take the form of hosting major events such as the Olympic Games, and the FIFA World Cup, but also sponsoring sports exchanges and international youth tournaments. The objective of sport in such cases is to foster peace-building between and within nations.

As a policy tool, sport can also incur a policy response from other political actors. Indeed, the politics of sport need not be conciliatory. It may be confrontational. Boycotts of major sporting events in protest to foreign or domestic policies are not uncommon. Indeed during the Cold War, boycotts and counter-boycotts constituted politics as usual. Another aspect of sport diplomacy is the banning of national teams from competition, such as the ban of apartheid South Africa. Symbolic protests staged by groups or individuals using the sporting event as a stage to express their views occurs with regularity. The raised fists of Smith and Carlos expressing Black Power in the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City exemplify this. The theater of protest may become violent, as seen in the attack by Black September on the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich games.

This article introduces this Special Issue of *International Area Studies Review (IASR)* on Sport Diplomacy, Politics and Peacebuilding. In addition, this article conceptually examines the role of sport diplomacy as a tool of soft power. We focus on the mechanisms and processes underlying these efforts, outlining both the positive and negative effects.

Sport can be employed domestically or internationally as a form of soft power. The concept of soft power was originally conceived in Nye's book, *Bound to Lead* (1990: 25–48, 188–202).¹ The concept was initially aimed at aiding US policy-makers to understand the role and limitations of post-Cold War hegemony. Soft power, nevertheless, is extensively used and broadly applicable. It can be defined as the power of persuasion, whereby one actor in a non-coercive manner convinces another to want the same things he/she wants (Nye, 2004: 8). Fundamentally this means that soft power features the normative, especially the internalization of norms. Of course the phenomenon existed before it had a name. Indeed, the practice of soft power has been and continues to be employed to some extent by all nation-states. In this article we expand the concept of soft power beyond foreign policy to also understand the role of sport politics with regard to domestic peace-building and nation-building.

This introductory article proceeds as follows. In the next section we present a theory of sport politics as soft power. Moving from the macro to the micro, and from the international to the local, there are four mechanisms at work: *image-building*; *platform for dialogue*; *trust-building*; as well as *reconciliation and integration*. Then we analyze the economics of sport politics, with a special emphasis on corruption. We next discuss the Nordic model of an archetypal model of soft power sport politics. Finally, we outline briefly the different articles that compose this special issue on Sport Diplomacy, Politics and Peacebuilding.

Theoretical and analytical focus

Diplomacy, and indeed politics more generally, conjures notions of rational bargaining involving a process of give-and-take. The processes involved are fundamentally strategic in that any action one takes accounts for the actions taken by others. Ultimately, choices are oriented to outcomes determined by the joint actions taken by the parties involved.

Yet, there are aspects of diplomacy and politics that do not involve an iterative process of strategic give-and-take. They are driven by social norms or perceptions of good or bad. Mechanisms such as image-building, building a platform for dialogue and trust-building, as well as reconciliation and integration, all describe processes of persuasion. These mechanisms are not necessarily sport-related, but are nonetheless especially applicable for understanding sport politics and diplomacy.

As tools of persuasion, these mechanisms constitute an aspect of soft power. Indeed, sport offers a venue through which actors both internationally and domestically can engage in the politics of persuasion. Power is relational, whereby it entails “the ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance with one’s own ends” (Organski, 1968: 104). “It would be a mistake to consider only the tangible instruments of power for intangibles can also be used to influence the behavior of others ... There is power in ideals, propaganda, in the granting of good will” (Organiski, 1968: 106–107). These intangibles are instruments of soft power.

Persuasion is an instrument of power fundamentally affecting perceptions. It can be thought of as a political investment, whereby devoting economic resources today gives you influence tomorrow. Moreover, “different methods of exercising power require different instruments, and the nation may possess the means for excelling in one method but may lack some of the requirements for practicing others” (Organski, 1968: 118). In other words, power has limited fungibility (Nye, 1990: 188–201).

Sport politics and diplomacy constitute a form of soft power. They aim to persuade and not coerce. As a tool of soft power, sport diplomacy is an important staple of foreign policy—used by great powers or middle powers. Sport diplomacy takes many forms. Previous research has looked at different types of sport diplomacy, for example, by examining the role of the Olympics or the World Cup (Alegi, 2008; Grix, 2013). In this introductory article, in contrast, rather than focusing on a particular sporting event or type of event, we focus on the mechanisms by which sport diplomacy is linked to peace-building, nation-building and international cooperation. Of course, the mechanisms may vary across forms, but our analytical focus is on different mechanisms at work and we generalize across all forms of sport diplomacy.

By mechanism, we mean “the pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished” (Checkel, 2013: 10). An important point made by Checkel is that mechanisms are unobservable ontological, but real, entities (Bennett, 2013: 206–207; Checkel, 2013: 6–11). Another important aspect of mechanisms, as Elster (2007: 36) notes, is that mechanisms are indeterminate in their consequences; they can work as intended or back-fire. Image-building, trust-building and reconciliation are not by themselves measurable. Instead, only the observable implications of these mechanisms can be operationalized.² This invites a variety of methods from historiography to comparative case study analysis to large-*N* statistical analysis. This Special Issue of *IASR* covers the full range of these methods. Two of the articles are statistical quantitative analyses, two are case studies (one is comparative and one formally theoretical) and two are historiographical in their analysis.

Mechanisms offer a theoretical means of understanding causal relations. A mechanisms approach is essentially theoretical. Mechanisms are not tied to a distinct methodology. “How we measure, interpret, and conceptualize stems from our theory, whether we employ quantitative or qualitative methods. Understanding patterns of causation comes from our theoretical explanations

and not from our method” (Gates, 2008: 27). The basic theoretical notion binding these mechanisms of sport diplomacy and politics is the notion of soft power or the power of persuasion.

Mechanisms of sport diplomacy and politics

We focus on four mechanisms through which sport constitutes an instrument of soft power.³ The first mechanism is image-building by investing in political capital, best exemplified by hosting the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup. Second, sport diplomacy can be a platform for dialogue; examples would include the Goodwill Games between the USA and USSR. Third, sport can be used to build trust between nations, communities and individuals. Football matches between Israeli and Palestinian youth meant to foster trust is an example. Lastly, sport can be taken as a catalyst for achieving reconciliation, integration and the promotion of anti-racism. Nelson Mandela’s promotion of South African Rugby just after the fall of apartheid was meant to achieve this.

Image-building

Hosting mega sporting events signals arrival on the world stage, and bestows on the host the world’s full attention for many days. Regimes use this as a way of mobilizing capital and human resources in a very short period of time, which would otherwise have been next to impossible. It is a quintessential example of the use of soft power. We refer to this mechanism as image-building by investing in political capital. Recently, China, South Africa and Brazil have used mega-sporting events to announce their status as rising powers. Another example would be the decision by North and South Korea to march under the same flag during the opening ceremony of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. In this Special Issue, Rhamey and Early (2013) show that image-building need not come through hosting a sporting event. By doing well in the Olympics, nations can enhance their international prestige.

The dark side of image-building is that, in the attempt to portray an efficient, modern and attractive image, the parts of a population that may embarrass the government may be excluded or neglected. An example would be Mexico’s policy of moving the poor out of Mexico City during the 1968 Olympic Games. Protests in Brazil against spending priorities in preparation for the 2014 football World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games also serve as a good example of how image-building efforts can back-fire.

As noted above, mechanisms are indeterminate in their consequences (Elster, 2007: 36). An investment in political capital may not work as intended. While middle and great powers have the opportunity to host a mega sporting event, such venues present a chance for other political actors to use the event for their own purposes. An example would be Black September’s attack on Israeli athletes during the 1972 Games in Munich. They chose the Olympics to maximize the symbolism of their cause. Obviously, this was not what Germany or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) intended, yet a third political actor was able to use the event to further their cause.

To further their own political agenda, nations can counter the image-building efforts of an Olympic Games host. An example would be the USA’s boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, and in turn the Soviet’s boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. The USA urged a broad boycott of the 1980 games to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Four years later, in retaliation, the Soviet Union urged a boycott of the games hosted in the USA.

Building a platform for dialogue

In 1986 the first Goodwill Games in Moscow between the USA and USSR reopened a broad channel to re-establish formal relations between the two countries. Similarly, Ping-Pong diplomacy formed the basis for the opening of relations between China and the USA. In general, sporting events, from the World Cup and Olympic Games to a simple friendly match, strengthen ties between nations and people, and provide a venue for peaceful cultural exchange, which can serve as the basis for further normalization of political relations. We refer to this mechanism as building a platform for dialogue. Here we should point out that hosting a sporting event can involve two different (but related) mechanisms. The central idea behind using sport as a platform for dialogue is distinct from image-building. One entails self-promotion (image-building), while the other (creating a platform for dialogue) features the promotion of a relationship. Hosting in and of itself is not the mechanism—indeed, it does not imply causality and it is observable. The construction of the basis for dialogue is unobservable, but with real consequences.

Sporting events can be used to highlight animosity rather than building a platform for dialogue. After the men's 200 meters race in the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, Carlos and Smith were stripped of their medals after raising their fists in a Black Power salute during the playing of the US national anthem. In stark contrast, the IOC excused the frequent Nazi salutes by German athletes during the 1938 Berlin Olympic Games. During the London 2012 Olympic Games after defeating Japan in the bronze medal match of men's football, Jongwoo Park held up a sign with a slogan supporting Korean sovereignty over the Dokdo Islands.⁴ Park was sanctioned by IOC, as it was considered counter to the Olympic ideals.⁵

More than escalating tension, sporting events may trigger violence. In 1969 Honduras and El Salvador fought what is often called the Football War. Land reform and immigration stand as the basis for the conflict, but the extensive riots that took place during two matches between the countries as part of the qualifying rounds of the 1970 FIFA World Cup were an important catalyst of the war. The issues of land reform and immigration increased the risk of conflict, but the sporting event was the proximate trigger to the riots and escalating violence. Instead of a platform for dialogue, the sporting event became the trigger of war. Sport definitely did not serve as a platform for dialogue.

Jung (2013) in this Special Issue examines the role of sport diplomacy in defining the changing relationship between North and South Korea. His analysis shows when sport diplomacy is more likely to be successful and when it fails. Jung (2013) underscores the role of domestic politics in this kind of intention of using sport to build a platform for political dialogue.

Trust-building

Moving ever more micro, sport can be used to build trust, and through trust-building build peace. Guthrie-Shimizu (2013) in this Special Issue discusses the role baseball played in restoring the relationship between the USA and Japan after the Second World War. Every year, Norway hosts the "Norway Cup", an international youth football cup bringing in teams from all over the world, including sponsoring teams from the third world. During the 1995 Norway Cup, for the first time ever a Palestinian team played against an Israeli team. This was considered so important that, when the Palestinian team traveled from the West Bank to Oslo, Yassir Arafat temporarily broke off the peace talks with Israel in order to go to the airport to wish the team the best of luck. The basic idea behind the running of such tournaments is to foster personal interaction from which understanding and friendships will develop. Through this bottom-up approach, peace is to be secured through the interaction of individuals from different communities.

Such events can also have unintended negative consequences. Every year, the Norway Cup brings in children from poor African countries, essentially treating them to two weeks of luxury by their standards. After the trip to Norway the youth return unceremoniously to their lives in abject poverty. This can breed resentment and disillusionment when they return to their home countries (Hasselgård and Straume, 2012).

As with the other mechanisms, the processes surrounding a sporting event cannot always be controlled. Sport can become nationalistic and jingoistic, creating tension between countries rather than understanding. Caruso and di Domizio (2013) in this Special Issue show that international political hostility and violence tend to be mirrored on the football pitch, especially when the sporting event means a great deal. Their findings show that sport does not build trust, but tends to only reflect the larger political environment, at least at the elite level. Their findings force us to consider the limitations of sport as a trust-building mechanism.

Reconciliation, integration and anti-racism

The fourth mechanism is used when sport is used to build peace within a country through reconciliation, integration and anti-racism. For example, in an effort to combat racism, UEFA has started an extensive anti-racism campaign aimed at influencing the opinions and actions of the fans, as well as creating respectful attitudes towards others. In South Africa, rugby, strongly associated with the white ruling class, was seen as a symbol of apartheid. As discussed above, hosting large sporting events can involve many mechanisms. In this case, Mandela's objective in hosting the Rugby World Cup was primarily to foster reconciliation and integration between South Africans.

The barring of participation in sporting events can also be used to promote anti-racism. Apartheid South Africa was banned from many sporting venues in the 1980s. In this Special Issue, Ndlovu (2013) provides a detailed discussion of the role of FIFA in fighting apartheid in South African football. FIFA suspended South Africa in 1963; South Africa was re-instated after the end of Apartheid and in 2010 hosted the World Cup.

Confounding factors

As we have underscored in our discussion of these mechanisms, their effect is indeterminate. Sport as a tool of soft power can have unintended consequences. An added complexity to the causal processes associated with these mechanisms comes with confounding variables. These factors are correlated with both the mechanism as the independent variable and the outcome or dependent variable. Different economic variables often work as important cofactors shaping the relationship between sport diplomacy and peace. On the one hand, hosting sporting events can spur economic growth, and be used to rejuvenate hosting cities. This growth can create a positive environment, further enhancing the prospects for peace-building and human security. On the other hand, the cost of hosting a sporting event may drain resources from public sector programs. A prime example would be the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games. The Montreal Games were popularly named the "Billion dollar games" and it took three decades to pay off the cost of hosting them. The protests in Brazil over budget prioritization in the period leading up to the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016 offer a case in point. Indeed, many countries that have hosted such mega sporting events have paid a large economic price for years afterwards. Others have managed to keep the costs down and have largely profited from the event.

Sport today is also tightly connected to the commercial sports industry. Athletic companies such as Nike and Adidas play critically important roles in sponsoring events and teams. The advertising dollars associated with mega sporting events are tremendous. The money connected with sport, in

turn, can entice corruption. Buying and selling of FIFA votes is an example. Allegations of the selling of votes for the siting of the Olympic Games can undercut the legitimacy of sport diplomacy. In this Special Issue, Jackson (2013) critically examines the role played by the sports industry through the concept of ‘corporate diplomacy’ and how it affects the relations between nations.

Each of the mechanisms outlined above are highlighted in great detail through a variety of approaches, ranging from large-*N* statistical analysis to comparative case study analysis to historiography. The articles composing this Special Issue of *IASR* examine different facets of Sport Diplomacy, Politics and Peacebuilding. Some analyze the effectiveness of sport diplomacy and/or examine its consequences, intended and unintended.

Special issue contributions

Rhamey and Early’s (2013) “Going for the gold: Status-seeking behavior and Olympic performance” examines the mechanism of prestige and image-building. Competition between nations for Olympic medals serves as the currency of comparison. The authors examine both the hosting of the games and the winning of medals. Drawing on Social Identity Theory they derive a set of hypotheses which they statistically analyze using linear hierarchical methods. Analyzing data for all Summer Olympic Games, 1960–2012, they find that states whose performance exceeds expectations and smaller-sized countries that play host to the games disproportionately gain status from their participation in sport. From the perspective of soft power, these results are particularly noteworthy. Olympic medals offer no direct fungible transfer of power to other dimensions of international affairs. They offer a rise in status alone.

Caruso and di Domizio’s (2013) “International hostility and aggressiveness on the soccer pitch: Evidence from European Championships and World Cups for the period 2000–2012” reverses the typical view of the causal ordering of sport and peace; instead, it analyzes how international tension affects play on the football field. Their analysis examines official matches played by national teams in the final phases of the European and World Cup tournaments. Using negative-binomial regression, they examine a variety of sport and political variables as they relate to the number of penalty cards, which serves as a proxy of the players’ aggressiveness. They find that commercial hostility, diplomatic tension and power asymmetry are positively and significantly associated with aggressiveness of the players on the soccer field. Sport may not be a tool for building peace, but an arena furthering conflict between nations. This article demonstrates how sport is not a manipulable instrument of power, but a mirror of relations between political actors. Sport is but a single aspect of a broader social–political milieu.

Jackson (2013) examines sport diplomacy from a more skeptical perspective in “The contested terrain of sport diplomacy in a globalizing world”. The paper views sport as a cultural site with unique features, which in turn affect and limit its use as an instrument of diplomacy. Jackson further examines the powerful role played by corporations in affecting the staging and conduct of sporting events. He shows how commercial sport interests, international non-governmental sport organizations (such as FIFA and the IOC) and nation-states interact on the global arena. He argues that, in the process of globalization, a transformational shift has occurred from state diplomacy to ‘corporate diplomacy’ (Jackson, 2013).

Sport diplomacy need not be directed outward as a tool of foreign policy. It may also be directed inward. The case of football in South Africa is exemplary, as examined by Ndlovu (2013) in “FIFA and the South Africa question: The 1976/1977 football unity talks and their impact on the development of professional football in South Africa”.

The history of the 1976/1977 football unity serves as the focus of this article. In apartheid South Africa, football was a “sport for blacks”, while in contrast rugby, golf, track and field, field hockey, cricket and swimming were reserved for white South Africans. This segregation was marked by

tremendous imbalance in funding, infrastructure and facilities between the sports. In association with the global anti-apartheid movement, FIFA and the Confederation of African Football used football sanctions as a tool to fight apartheid and racism in sport. As a consequence of these boycotts, the football unity talks led to the desegregation of football such that white, colored and black associations were united. The singularity of one football association served as an important background factor in the decision to host the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. This article highlights how international non-governmental actors used sport to influence domestic South African politics.

Of course sport diplomacy can also be employed as a tool of foreign policy. This is exemplified by the case of North and South Korea, analyzed in Jung's (2013), "Sport as a catalyst for cooperation: Why sport dialogue between the two Koreas succeeds in some cases but not in others". This article addresses two questions: (1) "what is the main force which drove the two Koreas to open a sport dialogue?" and (2) "why did sport dialogues between the two Koreas succeed in some cases but not others?" (Jung, 2013). In answering the first question, Jung shows how sport can serve as an instrument or catalyst for cooperation. To answer the second question, he divides the various periods of dialogues between the North and South into several phases and examines the role sport played in determining success or failure. Through the use of game theoretic analysis he demonstrates the importance of strategic decision-making for both parties. Jung shows how political intentions, changing conditions over time and contextual connectivity have affected the strategic thinking of the two Koreas and in so doing explains when sport diplomacy succeeded and failed.

Another case of sport being used as a form of soft power foreign policy is presented in Guthrie-Shimizu's (2013) "Japan's Sport Diplomacy in the early post-World War II years". In the early post-World War II period, under US occupation, both Japan and the USA wanted to normalize relations. This took place under the lengthening shadows of the Cold War. The audience was primarily the US public. The goal was to change the perception of Japan as a warmongering nation to an ally, partner, and peace-loving nation. Sport in general, and baseball in particular played a critical role in this process. Two mechanisms were in play: image-building and trust-building.

Summary

Persuasion is the essence of soft power. The goal is to convince in a non-coercive manner another political actor to want the same things one wants for oneself. Employed either internationally or domestically, sport can be used as a tool of soft power. Sport diplomacy and politics are not limited to the realm of foreign policy; they can be used domestically as well for building peace and nationhood.

As a tool of soft power, sport diplomacy works through four mechanisms: image-building; building a platform for dialogue; trust-building; and reconciliation, integration and anti-racism. These mechanisms are not deterministically controllable and can have unintended consequences. We have highlighted the intended and unintended consequences of each of these mechanisms.

Image-building as a mechanism is further explored in the article by Rhomey and Early (2013). The successes and failures of building a platform for dialogue are analyzed by Jung (2013). Trust-building is discussed by Guthrie-Shimizu (2013). Finally, reconciliation, integration and anti-racism are examined by Ndlovu (2013). Jackson (2013) describes the complexities and the confounding interests of commercial sporting companies affecting the use of sport as a tool of soft power.

Acknowledgements

We thank the Korea Foundation for a generous grant (no. 1140000-000248), which helped make this research possible. We also thank Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and the JeJu Peace Institute for helping organize two different workshops in March 2013. In addition we would like to thank Halvard Buhaug, Byun Dae-Ho, Kristian Berg

Harpviken, Kim Taekwan, Moon Tae-young, Håvard Strand, Yi Seong-Woo and anonymous reviewers, who provided valuable comments for the different articles comprising this special issue of *IASR*. We also thank those who raised interesting questions and comments at the panel at the 2013 annual conference of the International Studies Association.

Notes

1. Also see Organski (1968) on intangible forms of power and persuasion or Baldwin (1979, 1985), who elucidates the various forms of statecraft, including a form that very much resembles Nye's soft power.
2. For some advocates of mechanism-based social science, this precludes quantitative analysis. We, however, see no inherent logic by which the study of mechanisms precludes empirical quantitative analysis. In this respect we disagree with the epistemological arguments made by Checkel (2013: 9–11). We agree with Bennett, whose chapter appears in Checkel's book: "All of the three most common general methods in political science—statistical analysis, formal modeling, and case studies—can contribute to the development and testing of theories about causal mechanisms" (Bennett, 2013: 211–212).
3. We derived these four mechanisms from conversations with Kristian Berg Harpviken on the Norwegian model of peace-building.
4. The Dokdo Islands are controlled by South Korea but claimed by both South Korea and Japan.
5. In 2013 after a disciplinary hearing Park was given back his bronze medal.

Bibliography

- Alegi P (2008) "A nation to be reckoned with": The politics of World Cup stadium construction in Cape Town and Durban, South Africa. *African Studies* 67(3): 397–422.
- Baldwin DA (1979) Power analysis and world politics. *World Politics* 31(2): 161–194.
- Baldwin DA (1985) *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bennett A (2013) Causal mechanisms and typological theories in the study of civil conflict. In: Checkel JT (ed.) *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 205–230.
- Caruso R and di Domizio M (2013) International hostility and aggressiveness on the soccer pitch: Evidence from European Championships and World Cups for the period 2000–2012. *International Area Studies Review* 16(3).
- Checkel JT (2013) *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elster J (2007) *Explaining Social Behavior. More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gates S (2008) Mixing it up: The role of theory in mixed methods research. *Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association, Section for Qualitative and Multi-Methods Research* 6(1): 27–29.
- Grix J (2013) Sport politics and the Olympics. *Political Studies Review* 11(1): 15–25.
- Guthrie-Shimizu S (2013) Japan's sport diplomacy in the early post-Second World War years. *International Area Studies Review* 16(3).
- Hasselgård A and Straume S (2012) Norway Cup er lek—bistand er alvor. [Norway Cup is a game—but foreign aid is serious.] *Dagsavisen*, 27 July 2012. Available at: http://www.dagsavisen.no/nyemeninger/alle_meninger/cat1001/subcat1034/thread250692/#post_250692
- Jackson SJ (2013) The contested terrain of sport diplomacy in a globalizing world. *International Area Studies Review* 16(3).
- Jung G (2013) Sport as a catalyst for cooperation: Why sport dialogue between the two Koreas succeeds in some cases but not in others. *International Area Studies Review* 16(3).
- Ndlovu S (2013) FIFA and the South Africa question: The 1976/1977 football unity talks and their impact on the development of professional football in South Africa. *International Area Studies Review* 16(3).
- Nye JS Jr (1990) *Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Nye JS Jr (2004) *Soft Power. The Means of Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Organski AFK (1968) *World Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Rhamey JP and Early BR (2013) Going for the gold: Status-seeking behavior and Olympic performance. *International Area Studies Review* 16(3).